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1. Introduction 
In 2008, the seventieth anniversary of the Nanking 
Atrocity passed with limited international interest in 
the event that marked Japan's depredations in the Chi-
nese capital city of Nanking (Nanjing) from December 
1937 through January 1938. The event, including the 
wholesale murder of captured soldiers and civilians, 
and the rape of thousands of women, later became 
iconic as the "Rape of Nanking". This study will investi-
gate the facts of publication of the images from Nan-
king in the weeks and months following the event, in 
LIFE and LOOK magazines, two new United States pho-
tograph journals competing with each other and with 
the newsreels. They claimed a readership of seventeen 
million and one million respectively. The photograph 
journals' images were Japanese soldiers' 'souvenir stills', 
not meant for publication, but smuggled out of China to 
the West. Several western observers in the Interna-
tional Safety Zone filmed evidence of the human trag-
edy surreptitiously, but their images did not appear in 
newsreels until several years later. The publication of 
the still and moving atrocity photographs were a kind of 
novelty, signaling a shift in what public decorum would 
now tolerate. A few years later, the bloodbath of 
World War II achieved a new reality. As Susan Sontag 
generalized, photographs were a species of rhetoric that 
reiterated, simplified, agitated and created an illusion of 
consensus. Their daily pervasiveness during the conflict 
perhaps began to dull, if not corrupt the senses leading 
to our contemporary world of image saturation that 
Sontag believed diminishes morality and even numbs 
viewers to the point of indifference. If brutal images 
from Spain's civil war had begun this decade's cascade 
of horror in 1936, the Nanking images elevated shock 
effect. Incidentally, they helped to sell millions of mag-
azines (Sontag, 1977). Sontag extended these thoughts 
in a provocative article in 2002 (Sontag, 2002). 
By the 1930's photo-magazines were recognizable 
adjuncts of the news business in Europe, the Soviet Un-
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ion and the United States. Two features about them 
are striking: 
Photographs dominated their pages and the stories 
were generally simple or captions alone. They appealed 
to a readership that was, as an aggregate, young and 
more inclined to learn from pictures than from written 
sources. Second, these media tended to serve as mir-
rors and reinforcements of the dominant ideology of 
the country of origin. In Britain, for example, Picture 
Post came into existence in October 1938 and under 
the editorial guidance of Stefan Lorant and Tom Hop-
kinson, devoted itself to reflecting the national mood 
as the economically depressed nation slid toward the 
precipice of war while also appealing to the perennial 
whimsies of a young generation (Hopkinson, 1970). Its 
picture stories combined social comment with report-
age to promote a kind of left-liberal humanitarianism 
to which the establishment had to adapt. Importantly, 
it introduced 'new ways of seeing' derived from radical 
publishing in Europe into the commercial culture that 
appealed to a new and growing audience. The multiple 
characteristics of picture magazines was their reductive 
simplicity, emotional appeal, and yet serious intent to 
inform. In the United States, Life and Look magazines 
shared these values as business ventures trying to build 
a readership of millions and to compete with newsreels 
to deliver the visual rhetoric of a world in action. Of 
course there were exceptions to the Life and Look ap-
proach. For example, Agee and Evans "Let Us Now 
Praise Famous Men", originally produced for Fortune 
magazine with governmental financing, was unique in 
its even-handed grappling of what Agee called the 
"cruel radiance of what is" of America's hard edged so-
cial realities. It was also reminiscent of the more sober 
Illustrated America and Harper's Weekly in the 1890s. 
Edward Bernays and Walter Lippmann were influ-
ential thinkers in the 1920s who explored the role of 
public opinion in a democracy. The former was espe-
cially important in articulating the rules of modern ad-
vertising while the latter believed that in a democracy, 
an educated elite should direct and manipulate public 
opinion. Both built upon an existing understanding that 
emotions kindled by imagery tended to be an effective 
way to reach the millions of malleable citizens. Lipp-
mann had said it was impossible to credibly inform the 
masses on important issues and then ask them to de-
cide; decision was the job of the educated elite. John 
Grierson, a Scotsman from Britain who was studying 
public opinion in the United States at the University of 
Chicago, argued with Lippmann and claimed that half 
the equation was valid: it was possible, he believed, to 
use the emotional appeal of imagery to educate and 
motivate the individual in order to give him a the feel-
ing of having a stake in society. Grierson returned to 
Britain to apply the power of visual rhetoric to docu-
mentary film. Besides informing and moving the view-
er, he found one great strength of film was its appeal 
to the young, to the marginally educated, and to those 
semi-literate who did not read much at all. He under-
stood that the typical citizen was more adrift than not, 
and that emotional imagery, in the form of the creative 
treatment of actuality, provided another form of factual 
education. He claimed the purpose of documentary was 
propaganda as education; its images could create dem-
ocratic loyalties and intelligent understanding of the 
contemporary world. Grierson never denied that given a 
typical audience, documentary film, photojournalism 
and newsreel photography all exhibited a lack of intel-
lectual rigor. They tended toward the sensational and 
sentimental, but those were the elements that im-
pelled millions to act. In the complex world of the 1930s, 
there was a concerted struggle to use images to attract 
the loyalties of their citizens (Evans, 1984). 
Whether they were images from the Spanish Civil 
War or Japanese depredations in Asia, the object of the 
new visual culture was to treat the unimagined experi-
ence and to render it emotional. Images of children 
figured often because they were blameless victims of 
social circumstances. As we shall see, the photograph 
of a child casualty in the 1937 Japanese bombardment of 
Shanghai's railway station evoked cognitive emotional 
empathy, moral awareness, and identification with al-
ien victimization. That photo, whether candid or ar-
ranged, became so iconic, that today it stands as a life-
like sculpture that a visitor sees first when entering the 
Nanking Massacre Memorial Hall (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Baby Ping-Mei. Source: Karin Doerr. 
Because Asia remained an alien bailiwick for west-
ern correspondents, there were not many still and 
moving images that had emerged from China, at war 
with Japan since 1931. If the American public's reaction 
to the still photographs from Nanking was generally 
one of shock, there seemed to be a somewhat indiffer-
ent long-term emotional involvement, due likely to in-
herent western racism or the remoteness of a conflict 
that was 3000 miles away. Archibald MacLeish once re-
ferred to such reaction as "the superstition of dis-
tance", being so far away, a viewer might conclude that 
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violence, lies and murder on another continent were 
not believable (Stott, 1978). Racism, remoteness, incre-
dulity, and paucity of correspondents are elements 
that anchor this study of the Nanking Atrocity's images. 
As George Roeder Jr. stated in his seminal study of 
the American visual experience in World War II, it is dif-
ficult to assume precisely measurable or predictable ef-
fects of still and moving images upon public opinion in 
wartime America (Roeder, 1993). The same applies 
prior to the war, although there was significant interest 
in visual depiction of world events, from Spain's civil 
war to Japanese militarism in Asia. In January 1938 the 
American public flocked to see to the newsreel footage 
of the Japanese bombing of the American cruiser Pa-
nay outside Nanking. It was a vicariously lived experi-
ence, and not long afterward, Life and Look's still pho-
tographs of the Japanese depredations within the city 
probably added to growing American outrage at Japan. 
Linfield embraces the power of photography and takes 
issue with Sontag's criticism of the medium's deep emo-
tional bite. He also rebukes intellectuals like Barthes, 
Berger and key postmodernists who probed an image's 
spectacle, emotion and absence of context. (Linfield, 
2010). In the context of the time, emotion triggered 
moral revulsion and both elements reinforced the hu-
manist western tradition. 
Still it took years and actual war for the smuggled 
Nanking atrocity film clips to circulate in American and 
Canadian newsreels. In the United States, as part of 
basic training, millions of recruits saw the Why We 
Fight series in which the virulent phrase the 'Rape of 
Nanking' became a popular slogan; millions more saw 
the same series in and out of theatres. In Canada, 
these and other film images were matched to a carica-
ture of the duplicitous Japanese enemy as individually 
trustworthy yet collectively treacherous. The residual 
impact of these and the still photographs that Ameri-
cans saw cannot be measured scientifically, but in the 
modernist tradition of moral integrity, their propaganda 
value was clear. Once war came, the American news-
reel treatment of the Japanese aggressors was overtly 
racist; the Canadian propaganda effort, headed by John 
Grierson, used actual and manufactured atrocity foot-
age to demonstrate fanatic Japanese militarism in order 
to strengthen Canadian national morale. The lasting 
(anti-Japanese racial) impression created by Canadian 
theatrical newsreels would impel the public, already 
bitter over Japanese abuse of Canadian prisoners of war, 
to mobilize in common purpose. If one American epithet 
referred to the Japanese racially as "buck-toothed," Ca-
nadians saw Chinese-staged (black propaganda) images 
of Japanese soldiers attacking women and bayonetting 
a baby. For both countries, the newsreels' use of grue-
some Nanking images accompanied by a cascade of 
explanatory verbiage and moral invective reflected an 
informational world where news was as much about 
emotional imagery as about fact. 
As applied to today's geopolitical tensions between 
China and Japan, images and words continue to reso-
nate regarding events related to Nanking (Fogel, 2000). 
(If China uses the event to promote nationalism, it sim-
ultaneously reins in overenthusiastic activists). The 
best-selling book by the late Chinese-American author, 
Iris Chang, echoed the Holocaust as a paradigm of me-
morial culture, referring to the Nanking tragedy in her 
title as 'the forgotten holocaust' causing instant con-
troversy for its inaccurate association with the genocide 
of Europe's Jews (Chang, 1997; Yoshida, 2006; Waka-
bayashi, 2007). The latter book of contributions by six-
teen authors deals with an overview of the event, the 
debate over victim figures, perpetrators and collabora-
tors, and the ongoing issue of Japanese denial. Its de-
tailed methodology points the way for other research-
ers to follow. The Japanese deniers' argument is that 
most Chinese civilian deaths resulted from justifiable 
legal battlefield actions against unlawful combatants 
who were armed or had access to arms in the Nanking 
Safety Zone. They maintain (ignoring the illegal inva-
sion and occupation of China) that no deliberate mas-
sacre took place for which Japan must apologize or pay 
compensation. Wakabayashi's figures of 40,000 to 
200,000 victims from August to December 1937 reduce 
the issue to an argument about numbers. Numerically 
speaking, the Nanking count of between 40,000 and 
369,000 victims pales next to the Jewish losses of be-
tween 5.2 and 5.8 million. If the Japanese unleashed 
deadly weaponry against Nanking's prisoners of war 
and committed rape and pillage of numerous civilians, 
the Germans committed wholesale industrial murder 
against their victims, root and branch. An historical iro-
ny is that in1938, LIFE magazine referred to the tragedy 
of Nanking as a "holocaust", seven years before that 
word took on its contemporary meaning referring to 
the judeocide. 
In 2007–2008, the Chinese diaspora was reminded 
of the memory of the atrocity both in print and in three 
films by Chinese, Japanese, and western filmmakers. 
These films present the subject from each national op-
tic. (Ho, 2007, Nanking Christmas 1937; Mizushima, 
2007, The Truth About Nanjing; Gutentag and Sturman, 
2007, Nanking. Ang Lee’s (2007) Lust, Caution is a ro-
mantic drama set during the occupation of Shanghai 
while City of Life and Death by Chuan, (2009) is a main-
land China production that is suffused with the vio-
lence, death and sexual depredations associated with 
the Nanking Atrocity. 
Debate continues to revolve around Japan's refusal 
to acknowledge fully and publicly its responsibility as a 
perpetrator. The impressment of Korean women as sex 
slaves is now a more familiar issue while Nanking is a 
less cited symbol of Japanese sexual ravages of Nan-
king women and the related brutality of its civilians. 
This may be because none of the world economic pow-
ers wishes old wounds to cause a breach in the thrust 
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of today's consumerist world economy. Besides, China 
is very reluctant to allow the genie of public anger to 
percolate through its population, lest it lead to unintend-
ed political consequences for itself. This study concludes 
that the images and doctored footage from Nanking 
should be included as part of understanding a general 
cultural shift that accorded visual images a new re-
spect. What remains difficult to gauge is the impact of 
exposure to these barbaric images. Then, they were 
part of the need to mobilize public opinion for war. To-
day, one hopes they will not be used out of context as 
part of a growing public acceptance of, or indifference 
to the saturation of obscene images. If employed judi-
ciously and in context, they may lead new generations 
of students of World War II to grasp the impact of visu-
al imagery on mass populations. 
2. Background 
Japan had set up a puppet regime in Manchuria follow-
ing its 1931 invasion. In July 1937, using a skirmish as a 
pretext to attack Shanghai, Japan launched a full scale 
invasion of China proper. Nationalist forces under 
Chiang Kai-Shek fought fiercely, but were defeated by 
aerial bombardment and superior Japanese troops. 
Chinese nationalist armies withdrew to the capital of 
Nanking, slowing the Japanese advance by using a 
scorched earth policy that left the enemy no food and 
little shelter, a policy that caused the Chinese civilian 
population much grief. The Japanese were surprised by 
the ferocity of the nationalist forces' resistance and 
vowed revenge. Nanking's pre-invasion civilian popula-
tion of one million was already reduced by up to three 
quarters before the Japanese assault by 200,000 
troops. When they reached Nanking in December, the 
Chinese nationalists had laid waste key buildings and 
moved the capital to Chungking. Chiang withdrew the 
majority of his troops, leaving 75,000 to defend the 
city. As the invaders took and sealed off Nanking, 
50,000 Japanese soldiers unleashed a campaign of un-
restrained brutality. Emperor Hirohito's uncle, Prince 
Asaka, issued an order, "Kill All Captives". This encour-
aged lower echelon Japanese officers, short of supplies 
and anxious to build morale, to issue a policy of "Burn 
All, Loot All, Kill All". 
Unobserved by world media and contradicting their 
own propaganda about kind Japanese soldiers, Japa-
nese forces engaged in a murderous rampage until the 
end of January 1938. They sought out and machine-
gunned or bayoneted tens of thousands of Chinese 
soldiers who had surrendered. The victims believed 
they were to be imprisoned, not shot by gunners hid-
den behind camouflaged walls. Thousands more civil-
ian males of military age met a similar fate. In the final 
disgrace, troops raped indiscriminately some 20,000 
Chinese women and girls, many of whom they mur-
dered. The postwar Tokyo Tribunal established the 
"traditionalist" victim total of 300,000 killed and 20,000 
raped, figures that have been used ever since. Present re-
search estimates of Chinese murdered vary widely from 
40,000 (by Japanese authors) to over 369,000 (by Chinese 
authors). Rapes are even more difficult to document be-
cause of the shame and stigma associated with victims of 
this crime. Yamamoto (2000) discusses the two ap-
proaches that now characterize interpretations of the 
Rape of Nanking as traditionalist and revisionist. He 
spends considerable effort detailing extant figures on the 
killings, but concludes that wide divergences between 
Japanese and other sources keep from bringing both sides 
to closure. He spends much less energy discussing the 
rapes and other civilian depredations than he does argu-
ing about numbers killed. He circumvents the elemental 
question of Japanese aggression in China. Japan denies 
responsibility for letting loose and ordering its soldiers 
to perpetrate war crimes. Choy & Tong (1998) inter-
viewed a number of Japanese veterans who confessed 
committing war crimes of pillage, rape and murder on 
orders from their officers. This makes the issue of 
numbers far less important than the issue of agency. 
One has only to follow the chain of command to realize 
that the Rape of Nanking is undoubtedly a war crime 
that was official (unwritten until documents prove oth-
erwise) policy. Iris Chang transcribed several of these 
admissions in her essay "The Rape of Nanking" (Barstow, 
2000). Similar ground is covered in the docudrama Iris 
Chang: The Rape of Nanking (Pick & Spahic, 2007). 
The Chinese death toll debate began in the 1948 es-
timate of 200,000. This figure has been eclipsed by a 
recent statistic of 369,366, of which 190,000 were vic-
tims of mass killings and 150,000 were victims of ran-
dom killings including rape. Japanese officer Toshio 
Ohta discussed body disposal at Xiaguan where 30,000 
soldiers and 120,000 civilians including elders, women 
and children were disposed of. Revisionist scholarship 
of the 1990s challenged this so-called traditionalist in-
terpretation and cut by more than half the 300,000 
plus figure, though the figure of at least 20,000 or 
more rapes is not challenged. 
In collapsing Nanking, journalists Hallett Abend and 
Frank Tillman Durdin of The New York Times reported 
on the unfolding tragedy on 10–11 December 1937. 
Their photographs depicted Chinese refugees, some 
waiting to be admitted to the "safe" International Safe-
ty Zone that foreign residents had established. As the 
city fell, journalists left Nanking to file their stories in 
Shanghai. They were not allowed to return until the end 
of January. So there were neither photographs nor 
western journalists to witness the fall of Nanking on 14 
December. In fact, the news focus shifted dramatically 
on 13 December, when The New York Times reported 
that Japanese planes had attacked the American gun-
boat Panay not far from Nanking, resulting in the loss 
of several lives. The Times' photograph showed the Pa-
nay in its death throes after its crew and passengers 
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had abandoned ship. For the next three weeks, the 
sinking of the Panay remained front page news in 
many U.S. newspapers. The Panay story also played 
out nationally in the San Francisco Chronicle, the Los 
Angeles Times, the Des Moines Register, the Omaha 
World Herald, the Dallas News, the Little Rock Gazette, 
the Boise Idaho Statesman, the Phoenix Arizona Repub-
lican and the Kansas City Star.  
On 15–17, 19–21, 25, 26, and 28 December, the 
lead stories in the Times dealt with Japan's insistence 
the Panay attack was an error, for which it proffered 
apologies (and eventual restitution). In the midst of the 
hysteria about the gunboat, Durdin filed a story from 
Shanghai on 17 December that news reports of atroci-
ties at Nanking were like "…stories of war hundreds of 
years ago…when…a conquered city with its helpless in-
habitants should be given over for twenty-four hours to 
the unbridled lust of the victors" (Durdin, 17 December, 
1937). He concluded, "[the] terrorized population lives 
in fear of death, torture and robbery". On 18 Decem-
ber, under the banners "Butchery Marked Capture of 
Nanking" and "All Captives Slain", he reported the 
blanket looting and violation of women with a detailed 
description of Japanese depredations and rapes. He 
reported on 27 December that chaos and anarchy were 
facts in Japanese-occupied provinces; the story includ-
ed a picture of Japanese troops marching to Nanking, 
but none from the city itself. 
On the same day, LIFE published a pictorial essay on 
the Panay, using frames from the film that two news-
reel photographers, Norman Alley and Eric Mayell, had 
shot while on board the doomed vessel. The ship sink-
ing was the main story, and absence of dramatic pho-
tographs left the Nanking collapse a poor second. In 
the pre-television age, the public had developed an 
appetite for the visually stimulating experience of the 
newsreel (Figure 2). 
The next day, the Times played up the Panay inci-
dent not only because American national honor had 
been compromised, but also because there was a film 
record of the attack on their neutral ship. The footage 
was speeding its way across the ocean and continent, 
soon to appear in newsreels. This raised significant 
public anticipation and on 30 December, newsreel the-
atres reported lines around the block. This fed the Pa-
nay hysteria even more. LIFE reported that audiences 
allegedly broke into repeated applause after seeing the 
heroism of the ship's officers and civilians. Few knew 
that President Roosevelt had asked that the most damn-
ing footage, showing Japanese planes coming at the Pa-
nay at deck level, be censored. This was probably be-
cause negotiations regarding Japan's willingness to 
apologize and indemnify the United States were at a 
critical juncture. The footage was cut. Washington 
learned through code breaking that atrocities were oc-
curring in Nanking but their source remained top se-
cret. Without newsreel footage and correspondents' 
confirmation from Nanking, the public remained fo-
cused on the Panay spectacle. For three weeks, news-
papers in the United States made so much of the Panay 
sinking, that the Nanking Atrocity took a poor second 
in influencing pro-China and anti-Japan public opinion. 
By November, 1938, United States direct aid to China 
grew from $20 million to $100 million. As well, national 
support grew for an embargo against Japan. (Perlmut-
ter, 1998). 
 
Figure 2. Sinking of the SS Panay. Source: The Denver 
Post/ Getty Images. 
One can argue that the public's response to the Pa-
nay sinking took precedence because it was obvious 
that there was a shared national concern about the fate 
of one of its ships. It was only much later that stories 
appeared in mainstream print outlets like Time, Read-
er's Digest and Far Eastern filed by the western wit-
nesses in the Nanking International Safety Zone. By 
then, time had diminished the newsworthy immediacy 
of the event (Brook, 2000). The newsreel footage of 
the sinking of the Panay is available free online. 
Henry Luce owned LIFE, TIME and FORTUNE maga-
zines. Born in China to American missionary parents, he 
remained a lifelong champion of his birthplace and was 
probably America's most cogent pro-China spokesper-
son. (Herzstein, 2005; Perlmutter, 2007). The Luce press' 
portrayal of China as victim of Japanese aggression 
spurred the United States to enact embargoes on sales 
of critical resources such as oil, which set the stage for 
Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor.  
Luce had launched LIFE as a weekly news magazine 
in November 1936, with a strong emphasis on photo-
journalism. By 1938, he claimed its circulation was 17 
million. With some prescience, a full week before the 
fall of Nanking, LIFE ran a cover picture of a Japanese 
soldier with a machine gun and the caption "Fatalist 
With Machine Gun". The issue featured Japan's con-
quest of Asia, with one story about Japanese soldiers, 
headlined "Japan's Army Slogs Down Asia on Schedule 
Time". To a long shot of Japanese soldiers marching, 
the caption remarked "happy at their work". 
LOOK magazine, competing with the more popular 
LIFE, also celebrated America as a middle class experi-
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ence. As a general-interest magazine, it cultivated a 
largely superficial approach to contemporary society, 
filling its pages with photographs of movie stars and 
casual or striking events. Because it took months to set 
up its biweekly issue, on 21 December 1937 LOOK ran a 
photomontage of the August 1937 bombing of Shang-
hai. It was a tragedy unrelated to the disaster unfolding 
in Nanking. Using frames of moving picture film shot by 
Hearst cameraman Wong Hai-Sheng, one shot became 
one of the most iconic of the prewar period, showing a 
baby sitting amidst the wreckage of a bombed out 
Shanghai railway station. (LOOK magazine, 21 December 
1937) (Figure 3). 
A full description of the photographs and captions 
follows. Title: "A Chinese Baby Survives an Air Raid", 
Text: "On August 28, while hundreds of terrified Chinese 
huddled in Shanghai's South Station, 16 Japanese planes 
bombed the building. Two hundred were killed. The 
dramatic rescue of a child survivor is pictured here."; 
Photo: "Chinese man picks up baby found lying on the 
railroad track at bombardment of train station in August 
1937", Text: "An Infant Survivor of the Japanese bom-
bardment of Shanghai's South Station was found lying 
on the railroad tracks half hidden under the wreckage. 
Here a young Chinese man picks up the infant, starts for 
the opposite platform"; Photo: "Man with baby picking 
way through wreckage", Text: "The Baby Howls as his 
rescuer picks his way through the wreckage. When the 
bombs struck South Station it was jammed with poor 
Chinese waiting to escape war-torn Shanghai on a train 
to the south. Two hundred were killed"; Photo: "Man 
crossing tracks nearing platform". Text: "They Near the 
Platform…Two squadrons of 8 planes each bombed the 
station. At the same time, they bombed Nantoa, a native 
residential section of South Shanghai. A civilian section, 
Nantoa was totally unprepared for the raid and the 
planes flew away unharmed after the bombing. Previ-
ously the Japanese had announced they might issue a 
warning if Nantoa were to be bombed, but the actual at-
tack came without warning"; Photo: "Rescuer leaves ba-
by on platform", Text: Rescuer Leaves the Terrified Baby 
on the platform and returns to the wreckage to help 
other victims of the raid. Then a child and man approach 
to take the baby to a near- by first aid station. At the 
right lies the body of a 14-year-old boy, one of the 15 
children found dead in the raid. In bombing Shanghai, 
Japan struck at China's largest, wealthiest city. Planes al-
so have bombed Nanking, China's capital"; Photo: "A 
child lies on a stretcher as adult hands tend to his 
wounds", Text: "Lying on a Stretcher on a sidewalk, the 
baby receives first aid from a Chinese boy scout…Three 
weeks later, on the occasion of the Japanese bombing of 
Nanking, the governments of the U.S., Britain and France 
sent a note of protest to the Japanese government 
against the bombing of civilian populations. But aerial 
raids continue, with an increasing toll of dead. Chinese 
bombers and gunners, as well as Japanese, have been 
responsible for some of the deaths of innocent non-
combatants—American and European as well as Orien-
tal—in this undeclared war" (International News photo-
graphs). 
LOOK's account of the barbarity of Japanese aerial 
warfare shocked the world. An estimated 136 million 
people saw the shot on newsreel screens or in print. 
(Fielding, 1972; Jespersen, 1996).  
It became iconic for sharing four traits: wide recog-
nition, being a historically significant event, for evoking 
a strong emotional response, and for enjoying wide-
spread reproduction. (Hariman & Lucaites, 2007) 
Time's circulation was 1,000,000. The photo's effect 
was so powerful that when Madame Chiang Kai-Shek 
arrived in the United States five years later, a New Jer-
sey homemaker sent her a letter with three dollars to 
"help the little guy on the railroad tracks somewhere in 
China".  
United China Relief used this iconic image to sell 
millions of Christmas cards and to raise millions of dol-
lars for Chinese aid. Titled the Ping Mei card, the re-
verse side read: "This is Ping Mei—a child of China—
…he is one of 50 million refugees who desperately 
need food, clothing, shelter, medical aid". Time maga-
zine published it too, while appealing for money and 
underscoring the common interest and goals shared by 
the Chinese and Americans.  
LOOK's use of emotive captions added weight to 
the frames of the bombed railway station. Its two-page 
feature titled "A Chinese Baby Survives an Air Raid" 
displayed five frames including the above mentioned 
event with a Chinese rescuer in the image (Figure 4). 
A first picture explained the image of a Chinese 
man picking up the infant lying on the railroad tracks 
half hidden under the wreckage. A second still showed 
the man carrying the baby through the wreckage. A 
third photograph had him crossing the track to a plat-
form while the caption explained the unannounced 
Japanese attack on this civilian facility. A fourth photo-
graph depicted the infant, an older child standing next 
to his rescuer, the wreckage, and a dead child lying on 
the tracks nearby. The caption read: "…a child and man 
approach (above) to take the baby to a near-by first aid 
station. At the right lies the body of a 14-year-old boy, 
one of the 15 children found dead in the raid. In bomb-
ing Shanghai, Japan struck at China's largest, wealthiest 
city. Planes also have bombed Nanking, China's capi-
tal". The shameful image of the lone infant victim was 
evocative propaganda, a picture triggering a natural 
human response of revulsion. This iconic image helped 
construct a collective memory about the horrors of 
Japanese aggression and public discourse revolved 
around it as the Luce publishing empire helped keep it 
alive. Of course, the assertion that iconic images domi-
nate public opinion is grounded on the assumption of 
the importance of individual predispositions and val-
ues. (Perlmutter, 1998, 2007; Mitchell, 1994) 
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Figure 3. Baby Ping-Mei. Source: LOOK Magazine. 
 
Figure 4. Filmed images of baby Ping-Mei. Source: 
LOOK Magazine. 
 
Figure 5. Rescue of baby Ping-Mei. Source: LOOK Magazine. 
Situating the photograph in a related, but different 
context, a final photograph caption, titled "Lying on a 
Stretcher", depicted the infant on a sidewalk, receiving 
"first aid from a Chinese boy scout…" The text contin-
ued, "three weeks later, on the occasion of the Japanese 
bombing of Nanking, the governments of the U.S., Brit-
ain and France sent a note of protest to the Japanese 
government against the bombing of civilian populations. 
But aerial raids continue, with an increasing toll of dead. 
Chinese bombers and gunners, as well as Japanese, have 
been responsible for some of the deaths of innocent 
non-combatants—American and European as well as 
Oriental—in this undeclared war" International News 
photographs. (LOOK, 21 December 1937)  
The undoctored newsreel footage indeed revealed a 
tragic and hopeful moment, the rescue of a baby after 
Japan bombed the railway station, intentionally or not. 
Yet the arrangement of film frames could lead a doubter 
or denier to claim that perhaps the entire event was 
staged for the camera or the baby was placed on the 
track after his rescue and then left to cry. The more sig-
nificant historical fact remains that this child became the 
icon that spoke of Japan's careless attack on innocents in 
a civilian locale. One notes how different the film clip ap-
pears compared with the verbiage attached to the still 
frames. 
While it is difficult to measure the impact of this vis-
ual news item in isolationist America, a Gallup Poll taken 
late in 1937 revealed that if the Ohio floods interested 
Americans most in the preceding year (28.3%), the Sino-
Japanese war had practically the same effect (27.8%). By 
May 1939, seventeen months after the Nanking atroci-
ties, polls revealed that sympathy for Chinese rose from 
43% in August 1937 to 74% (Jespersen, 1996)  
Having covered the Panay story in December exclu-
sively, LIFE did not want to be scooped by LOOK, so its 
editors ran a grisly photograph on 10 January 1938: a 
severed Chinese head with a cigarette in its mouth (Fig-
ure 6). The macabre text read in dramatic language that 
echoed Time magazine: "Chinese head whose owner 
was incorrigibly anti-Japanese, wedged in barbed wire 
barricade outside Nanking just before the city fell De-
cember 14…Quite possibly the worst holocaust in mod-
ern history took place behind an official news silence in 
China's capture capital of Nanking between December 
10 and 18…In the indescribable confusion the Japanese 
shot down everyone seen running or caught in a dark al-
ley. In the safety zone 400 men were tied together and 
marched off to be shot. A few uninvestigated cases of 
rape were reported…The Japanese army permitted or-
ganized looting by its men presumably because its sup-
plies are getting low…" 
The graphic description adds to the disgust this im-
age provokes. Roeder (1993) notes atrocity photographs 
of Caucasian victims were generally not published. The 
fact was that once World War II began, LIFE was so re-
luctant to publish images of American dead, that its first 
such photograph appeared only in September 1943, 
eleven months after the soldiers depicted had died in 
battle. LIFE's editorial decision to let the Nanking photo-
graph out reflected a double standard: the Oriental as 
Other and a feeling that many viewers would consider 
the sight of Orientals murdering each other as nothing 
more than a confirmation of Asian barbarism, as op-
posed to eliciting sympathy, horror or motivating action. 
 
Figure 6. Severed Chinese head. Source: AP Photo. 
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The article ignored the issue of widespread rape, 
choosing a photograph of a Chinese father carrying a 
baby mortally wounded by a Japanese bomb fragment 
and another of Chinese soldiers and civilians at a city 
gate with Japanese soldiers hauling carts of looted 
supplies. Its caption read, "The organized looting of 
Nanking would indicate that the Japanese Army Com-
missariat needs food more than prestige". A two-page 
photograph spread followed, of Nanking refugees on 5 
December fleeing on a Yangtze riverboat. The text de-
fended the Nationalists' scorched earth policy as the 
way to defeat the Japanese (LIFE, 10 January 1938). 
While both LOOK and LIFE had published photo-
montages reporting the military debacle in Nanking, 
because virtually all correspondents had been evacuat-
ed, there were no visuals conveying the scope of viola-
tions and breadth of the massacre. LOOK ran a feature 
on war propaganda on 15 February 1938 without de-
fining what constituted war propaganda, good or bad. 
One page was devoted to Shanghai victims, depicting 
an old woman and a child, a mother nursing her infant, 
and another carrying her child through Shanghai 
streets. The pain of innocent civilians was clear, yet 
public decorum still demanded avoidance of the ob-
scenity of death and blood. 
On 18 April LIFE covered the Nanking massacre 
again with text that informed the American public of 
the depredations in detail. "These are the same sol-
diers who through last Christmas and New Year's 
treated Nanking, China's captured capital, to the most 
appalling mass atrocity since Genghis Khan. They raped 
Chinese women by the thousands, bayoneted and 
burned unarmed Chinese men alive in equal numbers, 
suffered the inevitable loss of morale. Since then the 
Japanese have been stopped and defeated by the Chi-
nese" (LIFE. 18 April, 1938). 
The photograph of Japanese soldiers dozing harm-
lessly in a Chinese temple did nothing to illuminate or 
nuance the text. Three weeks later, LIFE displayed a se-
ries of photographs of Chinese child actors touring the 
countryside in a propaganda play about Chinese farm-
ers uniting against a Japanese bully. In order to widen 
the propaganda effect of Chinese resistance, on 16 
May, LIFE put a head shot of a determined looking Chi-
nese soldier on its cover with the caption "Defender of 
China". 
The accompanying feature boasted (incorrectly) 
that China was putting the Japanese army on the run 
and that China's odds to win were better than 50-50. 
A powerful addition was a series of ten photo-
graphs of Japanese atrocities, frames taken from unat-
tributed film footage. American missionary John Magee 
had filmed hospitalized victims surreptitiously in the In-
ternational Safety Zone during the chaos, and fellow 
American John Fitch smuggled this footage out of Chi-
na early in 1938. Fitch circulated it to limited American 
audiences to inform them of Japanese brutality, but 
exhausted by his efforts, he soon ceased his one-man 
campaign. Perhaps because events in distant Asia had 
less resonance than almost daily Eurocentric news, the 
film lay dormant until 1942, when portions of it ap-
peared in a Canadian newsreel.  
George Fitch, who had been in Nanking, smuggled 
the Magee film out of China and circulated it to many 
civic groups in the prewar period in an effort to con-
vince Washington to cease selling scrap metal to Japan. 
Poor health prevented him from showing the film more 
frequently and he gave it to Arthur N. Bierkle who 
screened it to groups mainly in southern California. 
Wider dissemination occurred when The March of Time 
used some of the footage in 1942 and Frank Capra 
used segments in his wartime series Why We Fight: The 
Battle for China, 1944 (Kuykendall, 1996). 
The abovementioned stills were preceded by the 
text: "The most dreadful picture of the rape of Nanking 
this amateur photographer could not take. He knew that 
if he filmed civilians being shot down or houses looted 
and burned, he would be arrested and his camera 
smashed. Besides he was too busy, like other foreign 
missionaries and doctors, saving what civilians he 
could. But for two weeks he saw an army completely out 
of control, raping, burning, killing and robbing and de-
stroying without check. He saw a Japanese embassy 
completely powerless to restrain its own men. In foreign 
hospitals in and around Nanking he saw hundreds of 
innocent victims of 'totalitarian war". 
Accompanying each photograph was an explanation: 
1. Wounded Chinese in primitive basket who was 
transported to emergency facility. 2. Survivor of family 
of 11 standing among bodies 3.Wounded woman 
whose husband and child were killed. 4. Disfigured 
burned man, tied with 100 others, doused with gasoline. 
5. Man with bayonet gashes, who refused to yield his 
women to Japanese. 6. Woman nearly decapitated 7. A 
14-year-old boy beaten with an iron bar. 8. Man (po-
lice) struck with axe, recovering in hospital after feign-
ing death by firing squad. 9. A 19-year old woman 
stabbed 29 times, later had a miscarriage in a refugee 
hospital. 10. Body left to rot in roadside pond. 
Six months after the fact, these were among the 
most inflammatory photographs of the Asian conflict 
ever shown to the American public and an early use of 
the term "Rape of Nanking". These must be added to 
evidence that was steering (a still largely isolationist) 
United States public opinion to a stronger pro-Chinese/ 
anti-Japanese position. The next week, a photograph 
essay described Chinese troops going into action and 
achieving a victory; a week after that, war photographer 
Robert Capa's photographs depicted Chinese civilians 
witnessing air battles over the city of Hankow. Capa's 
images of war would become icons of the era even 
though these photographs of a mourning Chinese 
mother and the city of Canton under fierce Japanese 
bombardment were not reproduced in the millions as 
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were those of baby Ping Mei. The text predicted accu-
rately that these images of dead and wounded and a 
city destroyed were curtain raisers to the next war in 
Europe (LIFE, 30 May and 20 June, 1938). LIFE had shot 
its bolt as these were the last Nanking references in 
1938. China appeared in eight more issues, but nothing 
was as sensational as the Nanking photographs (LIFE 1, 
15, August; 17 October; 7, 14 and 21 November, 1938). 
Notwithstanding LIFE's larger readership, in November 
it was LOOK that delivered the most graphic photo-
graphs of Japanese outrages (probably in Nanking), in-
cluding the Japanese bayoneting of Chinese prisoners 
of war while soldiers watched (Figure 7). The LOOK 
captions were as graphic as the pictures. Under the 
headline "Killing For Fun!" the text read: "Hands Tied, 
Chinese prisoners are used as live targets for bayonets 
of Japanese recruits. In the foreground a captive is be-
ing tormented. Another (left rear) is being stabbed to 
death. A third (center) has just received the death 
thrust. A fourth (rear) is being driven into the pit" 
(LOOK, 22 November 1938). This photo was cropped 
and published again on 20 December, 1938. 
Additional text on the page charged the Japanese 
with butchering Chinese and burying them alive, mere-
ly for amusement, or to inspire raw recruits to kill. The 
writer explained: 
"We are sending you some pictures of killers in the 
act of killing. We have plenty of hard boiled corre-
spondents here—Steele of the Chicago Tribune, Dur-
din of the New York Times, Beldon, an ex-United 
Press reporter, Victor Keen of the New York Herald 
Tribune, and others and all of them reckoned the pic-
tures to be the worst things they had ever seen in 
China, bombing aftermaths and battlefields thrown 
in. The pictures were taken in Nanking and Soochow 
recently, that can be judged by the fact that the men 
are in their summer uniforms. In other words, the 
killings happened at least six months after the occu-
pation of those cities, when some blood lust, howev-
er bad, was to be expected. Thus, these pictures 
must come under the heading of diversion, or else 
the executions were staged to put the killer instinct 
into freshly drafted troops. The Japanese soldier-
photographers sent the films to Shanghai for devel-
oping and printing. They sent them to a Japanese-
owned shop and Chinese employees did the natural 
thing in exceeding the original printing order. Hence 
these pictures found the light. These Sons of Heaven 
went one worse than the Romans who, even if they 
sent their gladiators into the arena wearing half-inch 
armor, at least gave their victims a short sword and a 
sporting chance. As you will perceive, all these Chi-
nese soldiers and civilians were led into the killing pit 
with their arms pinioned." 
Captions explained that these were Japanese recruits at 
bayonet drill. Using Chinese prisoners as targets was a 
practice that was considered the proper way to season 
newcomers. This photograph was among sixteen souve-
nir photographs taken by Japanese soldiers. Duplicated 
secretly, these grisly images made their way to the West 
eventually and the entire set was used at the postwar 
Nanking War Crimes Trial in Tokyo (1946–1948). 
On the following page, a photograph depicted Jap-
anese soldiers watching execution of Chinese men. The 
caption read: "Rivers Run Red as Chinese are executed 
beside a stream. Several hundred Japanese soldiers are 
gathered around, watching the slaughter. The man in 
the foreground is toppling over dead. His head may be 
seen in the crook of his arm. The next victim is in place" 
(Figure 8). 
A second picture claimed, "Five Chinese Prisoners 
are Buried Alive, in this, one of the most gruesome of 
all wartime pictures. Enraged by the stoic calm with 
which the Chinese defenders are meeting their attack, 
the Japanese are more determined than ever to bring 
them to their knees. This war, now in its third year, is 
one of the most brutal in history" (Figure 9). 
A larger photograph depicted Japanese soldiers 
with fixed bayonets aimed at two bound Chinese, one 
tall, one short (Figure 10). The text stated: "The Big Boy 
Was Beheaded because he stepped on a telephone 
wire, but the Japanese soldiers spared the life of the 
little fellow. Because of a shortage of food, many pris-
oners in the bloody arena are beheaded. Both the Jap-
anese and Chinese face death with a calmness aston-
ishing to westerners"(LOOK, 22 November 1938). 
Another image of live burials appeared in the jour-
nal Pictorial Review with a story by Betty Graham ti-
tled, "Hundreds of Thousands Slaughtered in New 
Wave of Bestial Jap Atrocities." The photo and article 
are reproduced in Young (1997). The best known con-
temporary written accounts were by Timperley (1938) 
and Smythe (1938). 
 
Figure 7. Japanese soldiers bayonet Chinese prisoners. 
Source: Keystone/Getty Images. 
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Figure 8. Beheading a Chinese soldier. Source: 
Robyn Beck/Getty Images. 
 
Figure 9. Burying Chinese prisoners alive. Source: Key-
stone/Getty Images. 
 
Figure 10. Japanese abuse young Chinese captives. 
Source: LOOK Magazine. 
The photographs' impact should be included in ex-
plaining a Gallup Poll rise in anti-Japanese American 
public opinion. In spite of the continuing coverage of 
the China warfront, Henry Luce's LIFE directed the ma-
jority of its efforts on events in Europe through 1938. If 
a photo's visual syntax is universally comprehensible, it 
is difficult to assert what the viewers' possible re-
sponse to atrocity photographs would have been: per-
haps a combination of horror, anger and to a lesser de-
gree in isolationist America, a desire to punish the 
perpetrators.  
Further bibliographic and philosophical speculation 
about atrocity photographs may be found in the earlier 
mentioned Sontag article in The New Yorker. Linfield 
(2010) believes that photojournalism has come to play 
a role in the establishment of human rights legislation. 
Other approaches to this subject are Messaris (1994), 
Taylor (1998) and Newton (2001). 
A recent historiographical book on the moral, polit-
ical and educational aspects of the atrocity surveyed 
Chinese, Japanese and transnational authors, but did 
not attempt to gauge the impact on public opinion that 
pictures like these had when circulated in the millions 
(Fogel, 2000). 
Nanking disappeared from public discourse after 
1938. Some found the atrocity stories too shocking, be-
lieving they were similar to (untruthful) black propa-
ganda of World War I. Others had inverse attitudes: 
sympathy for the Chinese in Asia and prejudice to Chinese 
living in their city. Perhaps because of squeamishness 
about rape and barbarism (Eykholt, 2000), or because 
they violated standards of decency or because of gen-
eral provincialism, (Bayly, 2005, 2007; Mitter, 2013) the 
Nanking horror slipped from public consciousness until 
America was at war. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in 
1941 became America's rallying cry (Hotta, 2013). Only 
then did the 'Rape of Nanking' join wartime iconogra-
phy. Deluca (2006) argues that in iconic images, iconic 
becomes transcendent and that images transform 
rhetoric, politics and history. He cites Walter Benjamin, 
who said we are immersed in a torrent of imagery that 
constitutes public discourse. There should be more 
methodological investigation of how the widely circu-
lated newsreel images of the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor (especially footage of the exploding battleship 
Arizona) became iconic in convincing the American 
public to wage the Pacific war as a war of revenge. 
In contrast to the United States, Canada had no 
weekly national pictorial magazine. Its primary national 
magazine, Maclean's, said nothing about the Nanking 
atrocity. Only in February 1938, did a columnist from 
London mention Japanese-British relations and a Japa-
nese diplomat's cynical comment referring to Chinese 
aggression in Shanghai. The emphasis of Maclean's was 
exclusively Eurocentric, with a single reference in March 
to the possibility of war coming across the Pacific (Mac-
lean's, 15 February and 15 March, 1938). 
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Taking The Gazette (Montreal) as a typical English 
Canadian newspaper, its coverage of the fall of Nanking 
had no photographs, was based on the Durdin and 
Abend articles in the New York Times on December 8, 
10, and 11, 1937, and only once in December spoke of 
the Japanese soldiers' "breakdown of discipline." On 
January 25, in a dispatch from Shanghai headlined "Nan-
king Captors Run Amok", Abend claimed his sources 
were based on consular reports whose contents about 
assaults on women and very young girls were "actually 
unprintable." A day later, a Gazette editorial reiterated 
the Times' story and explained that Japan had forbid-
den foreign reporters to cable responsible editorial 
comments. On February 8 an article stated that Gen-
eral Matsui admitted that the army had run amok in 
Nanking, 'raping Chinese women, shooting private citi-
zens and looting property.' Japanese military authori-
ties' admitted that the depredations were "blunders." As 
shocking as this singular news coverage was, the Cana-
dian press did not purchase the extant images to fol-
low-up the story. These were the sole references to the 
Nanking atrocities. In the linguistic and cultural gulf that 
existed between Asia and Canada, the long history of 
ethnocentricity and conservatism demonstrated the 
failure of Nanking to register as anything more than a 
tragic fact. 
3. American Newsreels and Nanking 
One of the more puzzling elements surrounding the 
Nanking Atrocity is the American newsreels' failure to 
cover the event. Henry Luce's The March of Time, the 
premier newsreel series of its kind, ignored China in 
prewar issues, other than a March 1936 mention of 
Japan's 1931 invasion of Manchuria. Typically, its narra-
tion used "other" voices to mouth potentially hazardous 
judgments and one issue commented about militant 
Japan: "but as Japan's militarists march on behind their 
Emperor, observers may well wonder what a nation 
whose war dogs go mad at home might do if allowed to 
run loose throughout the world" (In December 1937, 
after the Japanese sinking of the USS Panay, nationalist 
rhetoric inflamed anti-Japanese public opinion. 
The March of Time series was a barometer of the 
growing influence of moving images upon news. It be-
came the most widely distributed newsreel in the Unit-
ed States with an audience of 12 million viewers in 
5236 theatres in 168 cities. If there was a dearth of, or 
no footage available, series director Louis de Rochemont 
used re-enactment freely and made decisions on what 
to run. Luce intervened rarely, if only to make Chiang 
Kai Shek a sacred cow (Fielding, 1978). 
In a prewar issue titled "Japan-Master of the Orient", 
the narrator reviewed Japan's "record of shameful un-
provoked aggression" without alluding to the horrors of 
Nanking. Hesitant to condemn the whole of Japan, he 
stated, "Sober Japanese wonder fearfully how long the 
patience of the great western nations will brook this 
lawless threat to the peace of the world." In December 
1941 "Battlefields of the Pacific" dealt with Japanese 
military aggression generally. In fact, between January 
1942 and August 1945, the series analyzed the Pacific 
war in only four issues, Crisis in the Pacific, China Fights 
Back, The Philippines and Australia at War. There was 
only one general newsreel devoted to China. The March 
of Time mentioned Nanking just once in 1942. Ignoring 
China echoed prewar American isolationist sentiment, 
owner Henry Luce's laisser faire policy toward the series, 
its Eurocentric outlook, and/or Louis de Rochemont's in-
difference toward the Chinese. Not surprisingly, after 
December 1941, American interest in the Pacific re-
volved around concern for American servicemen exclu-
sively.  
In contrast, a sobering treatment of the Japanese 
enemy occurred in one of the War Department's prop-
aganda series Why We Fight, made under the supervi-
sion of celebrated Hollywood director Frank Capra. In 
"The Battle of China" (1944), John Magee's Nanking 
footage was integrated into Chinese-manufactured 
atrocity images that had appeared in an earlier Canadi-
an newsreel from the National Film Board. Actuality 
images included a point blank execution of two bound 
Chinese prisoners, accompanied by the following nar-
ration, "But again, Japanese power was too great and 
after a battle lasting but a few days, the city fell to the 
invaders. In their occupation of Nanking, the Japs out-
did themselves in barbarism. The Japanese soldiers 
went berserk. They raped and tortured. They killed and 
butchered. In one of the bloodiest massacres in record-
ed history, they murdered 40,000 men women and 
children…"  
The appalling images showed victims who had been 
stabbed, raped, set on fire or nearly beheaded and the 
graphic narration spared nothing. "…But those who 
lived might better have died, for the horror of their 
twisted and torn bodies was worse than death…This 
nightmare of cruelty was all the more horrible because 
it was deliberately planned by the Japanese high com-
mand to tear the heart out of the Chinese people once 
and forever.” 
One can surmise how engaging and effective this in-
flammatory imagery was, even if the audience for this 
film was much smaller than the first film in this series 
"Prelude to War", which was mandatory viewing for 
millions of American recruits. Released in the fall of 
1944, "The Battle of China" was withdrawn briefly, and 
then reissued midway through 1945, reaching an audi-
ence of 3.75 million. One critic has labeled it Hollywood 
fairy-tale propaganda that strained credibility because 
it ignored Mao's communist armies (Communism was 
still a forbidden word in mainstream American media) 
and pretended that China was expelling the Japanese 
invader. 
The images trigger revulsion, but the propaganda 
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objective was to engage viewers to believe that the 
Chinese themselves would defeat the enemy. The nar-
ration boasted, "…And then it happened. That which 
Sun Yat Sen had dreamed of, that which Chiang Kai-
Shek had toiled for, that which is stronger than stone 
walls that had surrounded China: the will to resist. In 
their last bloody blow the Japanese had accomplished 
that which four thousand years had failed to bring into 
being—a united China…" Accompanying this verbiage 
were pictures of Chinese leaders exhorting their peo-
ple, reiterating the message of unity. The race card was 
played more viciously as the narration concluded that 
Japan planned to conquer North America and the 
world when "the Germans would join with their buck-
toothed pals coming over from Siberia." If nothing else, 
racism could be counted on to generate emotion. 
4. Canadian Newsreels and Asia 
For its part, Canada's military engagement in Asia had 
proven to be disastrous in 1941 with the fall of Hong Kong 
and the ignominious surrender of two ill trained and un-
seasoned Canadian battalions. 557 Canadians perished in 
battle or in Japanese prison camps (Morton, 1981). 
Learning of Japanese brutality toward all prisoners of 
war, Canada's film propaganda chief, John Grierson, 
tried to rally morale without stoking racist fires. On the 
heels of these military fiascos, this was a difficult task, 
since the Canadian populace largely approved the gov-
ernment's racially motivated removal of Japanese Cana-
dians from coastal British Columbia in 1942 (Granatstein 
& Neary, 1995). 
Invited to Canada in 1939 to establish and then lead 
the National Film Board, Grierson produced morale 
building theatrical and nontheatrical short films month-
ly to inform citizens and soldiers. Emphasizing propa-
ganda as "education", the films systematically shaped 
perceptions, manipulated cognitions and directed be-
havior (Grierson, 1946). Film Board productions includ-
ed four theatrical issues on Asia from 1942 to 1944, In-
side Fighting China, The Mask of Nippon, When Asia 
Speaks and Fortress Japan. These newsreels, reaching 
two million at home and up to ten million internation-
ally, defined Canada's Asian propaganda strategy: to 
vilify Japanese aggression, not the Japanese people. In 
July 1942 Inside Fighting China showed the film clip of 
Japanese executing Chinese captives. Lorne Greene, 
the paternal voice of democracy in Canada's wartime 
newsreels, asserted soberly that the Japanese were us-
ing liquid fire, gas, and bacterial warfare to butcher ci-
vilians and soldiers. The narration concluded that Chi-
na, with communists and nationalists united, was 
destroying the myth of Nippon the invulnerable. There 
was no mention of the Nanking atrocity. 
Grierson's propaganda approach was ideologically 
simple: portray the Japanese as individually trustwor-
thy but collectively treacherous. This theme was cen-
tral to The Mask of Nippon, in September 1942. The film 
began with a crude physical characterization of Japanese 
soldiers as "little men, quick and wiry; their uniforms 
slovenly, their faces, even in the heat of battle, tawny 
masks, black, expressionless". There followed a series of 
quick cuts to Japanese troops in combat, and a shot of 
Japanese soldiers brutalizing a crowd of Chinese civil-
ians, with one seizing and rough-handling a mother and 
child. Then another threw the child into the air as the 
other's bayonet pitched the child's body out of the 
frame. There followed clips of bound Chinese prisoners 
being thrown into a pit, being buried alive, shot at point 
blank range, and finally civilians dragging a corpse, liter-
ally in ribbons. The narration was accompanied by a cho-
rus of female screams, heightened by a high pitched 
Oriental flute. This was the most atrocity-filled war foot-
age ever shown to Canadians. The crowd scene, the bur-
ying alive of prisoners, the woman, and the bayoneted 
child were in fact staged, taken from a Chinese-made 
propaganda film and inserted as actuality footage along 
with segments of the Magee film. Mixing black (staged) 
and white (authentic) propaganda was allowable if the 
result articulated the true larger picture. The narration 
made reference neither to Nanking nor to the prove-
nance of the footage. The evocative impact of soldiers 
bayoneting the child remained indelible as audiences 
would have absorbed the whole as "authentic". A num-
ber of stills from the staged sequences continue today to 
be used, (probably unknowingly), as actuality photo-
graphs from Nanking. A wall of verbiage, accompanied 
by stock iconography of Japanese cultural images, re-
minded the viewer that the enemy was dangerous, but 
beatable psychologically and militarily. In July 1944 For-
tress Japan gave an account of the Allied advance on be-
leaguered Japan, using footage of dead Japanese sol-
diers to demonstrate that the Allied drive would break 
Japan's militaristic spirit: "And so, a nation which has ev-
er held life cheap, prepares to practice once again its an-
cient arts of death…" Tom Daly, the editor, defended 
these Asia films, noting that they did not substitute 
emotional racism for a true thing nor did they deny the 
Japanese were intelligent people. He and director/writer 
Stuart Legg had no misgivings about using the Chinese-
manufactured (black) propaganda to drive home the 
point. Black propaganda is usually defined as material 
where the role of the authorities is deliberately ob-
scured, or where it appears to come from the people at 
which it is aimed. Audiences had no idea that the most 
brutal images were staged sequences (Figure 11). 
5. Japanese Propaganda and the Nanking Atrocity 
If Canada's propaganda tried to keep truth as its touch-
stone, the Japanese had no qualms about employing 
black propaganda in their sophisticated campaign to 
deny the Nanking atrocity. The Japanese public learned 
of the fall and occupation of Nanking through jingoist 
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headlines and newsreel pictures of the victory parade 
led by their triumphant general. The Japan Advertiser 
photo section boasted of a barbaric contest between 
two lieutenants as to who could behead more Chinese 
prisoners. The tally of 106 to 105 led them to call light-
heartedly for a new contest to resolve which of them 
to name the "winner". After the war, the Allied War-
time Tribunal used the celebrated "killing contest" pho-
to to condemn the two to hanging for war crimes. 
Many in this culture that celebrated "bushido" never 
understood why (Figure 12). 
Sanitized Japanese newsreels showed troops 
fighting their way into Nanking, followed by "Bonsai" 
victory salutes on the city walls. To offset rumors at home 
of civilian atrocities, Tokyo invited Japanese visitors to 
tour the city in January 1938. The tourists gave sweets to 
Chinese children and saw nothing of the ongoing rape and 
carnage. Japanese newsmen took pictures of "spontane-
ous" New-Year's celebrations in which gleeful residents 
also welcomed Japanese soldiers who handed out 
sweets (Figure 13). Other photographs depicted chil-
dren receiving care from a Japanese medical doctor. 
A few reports had the audacity to declare that the 
Chinese, not the Japanese, were responsible for the 
looting, raping and burning. The occupying forces also 
dropped leaflets promising food and clothing if the 
Chinese returned to their homes. Thousands of hopeful 
victims left refugee camps in response to a leaflet fea-
turing a Japanese soldier holding a Chinese child in his 
arms and distributing rice by the bagful (Figure 14). 
Black propaganda beckoned Chinese to return to their 
homes to receive food and clothing. Undisciplined Jap-
anese troops then victimized many who returned. 
6. Conclusion 
This study has argued that because the world was not 
yet buried in a surfeit of images, pictures commanded a 
degree of moral authority. Decades later, a stark post-
modernist view articulated by Susan Sontag insisted that 
photographs from "the slaughter bench of history" do 
not necessarily induce pathos and sentiment, nor are 
they the source of ethical and political knowledge. She 
divorced moral and ethical judgment from the experi-
ence of viewing, in part because of the sheer volume of 
images in our daily lives. In contrast, John Taylor denies 
that the plethora of images provokes weariness and dis-
trust, claiming instead that the very awfulness of images 
can and does define civility. Modernism needs reconsid-
eration, he believes, and through it we remember the im-
portance of images' connection to morality (Taylor, 1998). 
Observing the still photographs and newsreels devoted 
to Japanese ravages in Nanking, a number of salient 
points emerge. In the relatively new practice of twenti-
eth century mass spectatorship, there came into being a 
new public discourse and public sphere in which media-
generated imagery operated on both conscious and 
unconscious levels (Newton, 2001). It is not possible to 
state with certainty the effect of the images upon the 
millions who view them, but it is likely that the widely 
circulated still photographs in LIFE and LOOK contrib-
uted to changing or confirming public opinion about 
militant Japan. 
 
Figure 11. 'Child' (a doll) bayoneted in Chinese propa-
ganda film. Source: National Film Board of Canada. 
 
Figure 12. Japanese soldiers' killing contest. Source: 
The Japan Advertiser. 
 
Figure 13. Japanese soldiers handing out sweets to Chi-
nese children. Source: The Japan Advertiser. 
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Figure 14. Japanese propaganda in China. Source: Un-
known Japanese. 
Iconic photographs such as those of baby Ping Mei 
in the ruins of a Shanghai railway station or Japanese 
soldiers bayoneting Chinese POWs compelled a degree 
of moral awareness. Though the event was about far 
away alien victimization, the pain and identification 
they projected were, we believe, unmistakable. In 1937 
the world was on the brink of conflagration and even if 
their impact is dulled by context and time, their power 
to summon humanist impulses then, stands in contrast 
to Sontag's insistence that images blunt morality and 
serve to promote pathos and sentiment (Hariman & 
Lucaites, 2007).  
Earlier we observed the prewar sinking of the Ameri-
can gunboat Panay. It had a probable catalytic effect on 
the public that interpreted it emotionally as a national 
affront, not only because it was captured on film, but al-
so because the press reinforced its importance for 
weeks. The lines of patrons at newsreel theatres 
demonstrated the American public's taste for "news" as 
images, as sentiment, and even in the prewar world, as a 
form of jingoist sport. Whatever the motivation, later 
public opinion surveys demonstrated American sympa-
thies were measurably pro-China and anti-Japan follow-
ing exposure to the visual and print information. 
That said, the trauma of being a combatant in war 
produced a willingness in both the United States and 
Canada to use images as public opinion leaders em-
ploying white and black propaganda. One can appreci-
ate how the "Rape of Nanking", synonymous with Jap-
anese barbarity, assumed its iconic role. The 1942 and 
1944 newsreel pictures of the Nanking atrocities rein-
forced anti-Japanese public opinion at the least. If John 
Magee's actuality footage from Nanking and staged 
images of panicked civilians in The March of Time 
stirred American audiences to demand revenge, so too 
did the lurid theatrical bayoneting of the child in Cana-
da's newsreel, The Mask of Nippon. But propaganda 
chief John Grierson insisted that such images should be 
balanced by showing the human side of the Japanese; 
Canada's propaganda goal was to ensure that patterns 
of peace, not revenge, ultimately prevailed (Aitken, 
1988; Evans, 2005). Being wartime, no one went on 
record to protest suspected image manipulation, a clear 
suspicion if one analyzes the perfectly positioned cam-
era and actors. In Japan, the "killing contest" aside, (cit-
izens in Japan's militarist society accepted the warrior's 
cliché Kill or Be Killed) the Japanese produced their 
own black propaganda to convince citizens of their 
humane treatment of the Chinese noncombatant 
population. One may conclude that if such images had 
their intended salutary effect, later evidence demon-
strates they were dishonest to the core. 
One of the great tragedies in recounting the Nan-
king event is the issue of females being "taken away" 
as witness Lewis Smythe expressed it so delicately in 
1938. The "comfort women" controversy of the 1990s, 
triggered by current feminist discourse, raised the issue 
of sexual slavery and sexual assault, but little about the 
history that led to it. The fact that the Japanese com-
mand never planned for the sexual needs of its occupy-
ing troops was one catalyst that led to widespread rape 
(Wakabayashi, 2007). Subsequently, Japan attached 
(mainly Korean) "comfort women" to its troops to pre-
vent a similar catastrophe from recurring. As well, such 
ravages were meant to humiliate the conquered popu-
lations. Today these surviving Korean females wait for 
a full public apology. Years later, Japanese service-
men's 'souvenir photographs' of the female despolia-
tions served to demonstrate how powerful a photo-
graph can be in terms of its ability to enrage civilized 
consciousness, no matter what the citizenship of the 
beholder is, and to remind one that suppression of the 
transgression of wartime rape is too often ignored in 
consideration of public propriety. Today the photo-
graph below of this shamefully humiliated victim 
stands in a prominent place in the Nanjing Massacre 
Memorial Hall (Figure 15). 
One is reminded of John Taylor's reference to how 
images of horror function cognitively as a peculiar blend 
of fear and disgust. They are both an affront and threat 
that people may share. Citing John Keane, he reminds us 
of how exposure to horror functions to keep memories 
alive, to heighten awareness of current cruelties, to raise 
issues about whether violence is justified, and to en-
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courage remedies for savagery. At the same time one 
never knows if viewers respond to pictures and film with 
curiosity, esthetic distance or emotional involvement. 
What we have demonstrated in this research is that pre-
served images become part of historical memory (Tay-
lor, 1998; Devereaux & Hillman, 1995; Keane, 1996).  
LIFE and LOOK's publication of atrocious photo-
graphs posed the question of what standard was used 
to decide what was proper to see. It is clear that a reg-
ular diet of such images would have provoked reac-
tions of disgust, hence the media themselves deter-
mined taste and tone. This study has documented their 
chronology and contribution to historical public dis-
course. Once war came, the moving images of Nanking 
served to remind the public that the enemy's acts had 
been hateful and that common action would lead to 
Japan's defeat. Republishing these images in 2014 is 
meant to waken the public from moral slumber, indif-
ference and historical amnesia and to remind present 
and future perpetrators around the world that there 
must be a reckoning for their crimes against humanity. 
Why did China let Nanking slip from postwar public 
scrutiny? A faltering Nationalist China ignored the atroci-
ty in exchange for Japanese political support in the late 
1940s; after the Communists formed China's govern-
ment in 1949, their own political expediency demanded 
that the shame be ignored. Since the 1990s, circulation 
of Nanking atrocity photographs has revitalized the 
event's iconic status. This relates to the emergence of a 
confident China, where nationalists at home and abroad 
demand historical justice, as well as to surviving Korean 
"comfort women" who claim the same. Japan's revision-
ists refuse to face history squarely because this would 
require that nation to relinquish its postwar status as 
victim. Contemporary conservative guardians continue 
to ignore the Nanking atrocity in Japan's history books. 
Japanese denial of scope and depth aside, the Nanking 
outrage serves a positive propaganda function of re-
minding governments that they are answerable for the 
acts of their soldiers. New generations of soldiers and ci-
vilian collaborators need to know that if they are told to 
obey and to ignore their conscience, they must, in the 
long run, answer in the court of posterity. 
The absence of official postwar Japanese regret or 
willingness to pay reparations can be explained by Cold 
War politics that made it easier for public memory to 
lapse (Chang, 2000; Yoshida, 2000). Iris Chang concluded 
that Japan's refusal to accept responsibility for the vic-
tims of Nanking was a reflection of human nature: she 
thought unspeakable acts become banalities if they oc-
cur far enough away to pose no personal threat. That is 
one sad conclusion to draw about the Japanese war in 
Asia. American postwar interest in Japan had more to do 
with establishing a constitution and democracy than 
with accounting for Japanese brutality in China. As histo-
rians, some perpetrators, and many in the public now 
demand an explanation for this historical crime, one re-
calls Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel's sober words "Who-
ever hears a witness to the Holocaust becomes a witness 
and messenger too" (Bonisteel, 1973). The unleashing of 
the Japanese soldiers on Nanking should not be allowed 
to stand as only another sad statistic of human misery. 
We believe the images referred to in this study impose 
rather than create a space for meanings (Hardt & Bren-
nan, 1999) and serve a double purpose: they monumen-
talize shame until Japan accepts its moral responsibility, 
after which proper mourning and the integration of the 
collective memory of both Japan and China will be satis-
fied. Second, they may also serve to help Japan adopt 
the politics of atonement officially. If this results in some 
lingering private resentment, at the very least, it will at 
last force a fair and ongoing public dialogue between 
Asia's two Great Powers. 
 
Figure 15. The humiliation of sexually ravaged women. 
Source: Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall. 
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